Intruder deducibility constraints with negation. Decidability and application to secured service compositions. by Avanesov, Tigran et al.
Intruder deducibility constraints with negation.
Decidability and application to secured service
compositions.
Tigran Avanesov, Yannick Chevalier, Michae¨l Rusinowitch, Mathieu Turuani
To cite this version:
Tigran Avanesov, Yannick Chevalier, Michae¨l Rusinowitch, Mathieu Turuani. Intruder de-
ducibility constraints with negation. Decidability and application to secured service composi-
tions.. [Research Report] RR-8017, INRIA. 2012. <hal-00719011>
HAL Id: hal-00719011
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-00719011
Submitted on 18 Jul 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
IS
S
N
02
49
-6
39
9
IS
R
N
IN
R
IA
/R
R
--
80
17
--
FR
+E
N
G
RESEARCH
REPORT
N° 8017
July 2012
Project-Teams CASSIS
Intruder deducibility
constraints with negation.
Decidability and
application to secured
service compositions.
Tigran Avanesov , Yannick Chevalier , Michaël Rusinowitch ,
Mathieu Turuani

RESEARCH CENTRE
NANCY – GRAND EST
615 rue du Jardin Botanique
CS20101
54603 Villers-lès-Nancy Cedex
Intruder deducibility constraints with
negation. Decidability and application to
secured service compositions.∗
Tigran Avanesov † ‡ §, Yannick Chevalier ‡, Michaël
Rusinowitch †, Mathieu Turuani †
Project-Teams CASSIS
Research Report n° 8017 — July 2012 — 21 pages
Abstract: The problem of finding a mediator to compose secured services has been reduced
in our former work to the problem of solving deducibility constraints similar to those employed
for cryptographic protocol analysis. We extend in this paper the mediator synthesis procedure
by a construction for expressing that some data is not accessible to the mediator. Then we give
a decision procedure for verifying that a mediator satisfying this non-disclosure policy can be
effectively synthesized. This procedure has been implemented in CL-AtSe, our protocol analysis
tool. The procedure extends constraint solving for cryptographic protocol analysis in a significative
way as it is able to handle negative deducibility constraints without restriction. In particular it
applies to all subterm convergent theories and therefore covers several interesting theories in formal
security analysis including encryption, hashing, signature and pairing.
Key-words: Web services, orchestration, security policy, separation of duty, deducibility con-
straints, cryptographic protocols, formal methods, tool
∗ This work is supported by FP7 AVANTSSAR [4] and FP7 NESSoS [20] projects.
† INRIA Nancy Grand Est, France. Email: {rusi, turuani}@inria.fr
‡ IRIT, Université de Toulouse, France. Email: ychevali@irit.fr
§ SnT, Université du Luxembourg, Luxembourg. Email: tigran.avanesov@uni.lu
Contraintes de deducibilité avec négation
Résumé : Voir “Abstract”
Mots-clés : Services Web, orchestration, politique de sécurité, séparation des
tâches, contraintes de deducibilité, protocoles de sécurité, méthodes formelles,
util
Intruder deducibility constraints with negation. 3
1 Introduction
1.1 Context
Trust and security management in distributed frameworks is known to be a
non-trivial critical issue. It is particularly challenging in Service Oriented Ar-
chitecture where services can be discovered and composed in a dynamic way.
Implemented solutions should meet the seemingly antinomic goals of openness
and flexibility on one hand and compliance with data privacy and other regu-
lations on the other hand. We have demonstrated in previous works [6, 22, 2]
that functional agility can be achieved for services with a message-level secu-
rity policy by providing an automated service synthesis algorithm. It resolves a
system of deducibility constraints by synthesizing a mediator that may adapt,
compose and analyze messages exchanged between client services and having
the functionalities specified by a goal service. It is complete as long as the secu-
rity policies only apply to the participants in the orchestration and not on the
synthesized service nor on who is able to participate. However security policies
often include such non-deducibility constraints on the mediator. For instance
an organisation may not be trusted to efficiently protect the customer’s data
against attackers even though it is well-meaning. In this case a client would
require that the mediator synthesized to interact with this organization must
not have direct access to her private data, which is an effective protection even
in case of total compromise. Also it is not possible to specify that the media-
tor enforces e.g. dynamic separation of duty, i.e., restrictions on the possible
participants based on the messages exchanged.
Since checking whether a solution computed by our previous algorithm sat-
isfies the non-deducibility constraints is not complete, we propose in this paper
to solve during the automated synthesis of the mediator both deducibility and
non-deducibility constraints. The former are employed to specify a mediator
that satisfies the functional requirements and the security policy on the mes-
sages exchanged by the participants whereas the latter are employed to enforce
a security policy on the mediator and the participants to the orchestration.
Original contribution. We have previously proposed decision procedures [6,
22, 2] for generating a mediator from a high-level specification with deducibility
constraints of a goal service. In this paper we extend the formalism to include
non-deducibility constraints in the specification of the mediator and provide a
decision procedure synthesizing a mediator for the resulting constraint systems.
Related works. In order to understand and anticipate potential flaws in com-
plex composition scenarios, several approaches have been proposed for the for-
mal specification and analysis of secure services [10, 8]. Among the works ded-
icated to trust in multi-agent systems, the models closest to ours are [12, 15]
in which one can express that an agent trusts another agent in doing or for-
bearing of doing an action that leads to some goal. To our knowledge no work
has previously considered the automatic orchestration of security services with
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policies altogether as ours. However there are some interesting related attempts
to analyze security protocols and trust management [17, 11]. In [17] the author
uniformly models security protocols and access control based on trust man-
agement. The work introduces an elegant approach to model automated trust
negotiation. We also consider an integrated framework for protocols and policies
but in our case i) policies can be explicitly negative such as non-disclosure poli-
cies and separation-of-duty ii) we propose a decision procedure for the related
trust negotiation problem iii) we do not consider indistinguishability proper-
ties. In [11] security protocols are combined with authorization logics that can
be expressed with acyclic Horn clauses. The authors encode the derivation of
authorization predicates (for a service) as subprotocols and can reuse in that
way the constraint solving algorithm from [19] to obtain a decision procedure.
In our case we consider more general intruder theories (subterm convergent
ones) but focus on negation. We conjecture that our approach applies to their
authorization policies too.
Our decision procedure for general (negative and positive) constraints extend
[7] where negative constraints are limited to have ground terms in right-hand
sides, and the deduction system is Dolev-Yao system [9], a special instance of
the subterm deduction systems we consider here. In [14] the authors study a
class of contract signing protocols where some very specific Dolev-Yao negative
constraints are implicitly handled.
Finally one should note that the non deducibility constraints we consider
tell that some data cannot be disclosed globally but they cannot express finer-
grained privacy or information leakage notions relying on probability such as
for instance differential privacy.
Paper organization. In Subsection 1.2 we introduce a motivating banking
application and sketch our approach to obtain a mediator service. To our knowl-
edge this application is out of the scope of alternative automatic methods. In
Section 2 we present our formal setting. A deduction system (Subsection 2.2)
describes the abilities of the mediator to process the messages. The mediator
synthesis problem is reduced to the resolution of constraints that are defined
in Subsection 2. In Section 3 we recall the class of subterm deduction systems
and their properties. These systems have nice properties that allow us to de-
cide in Section 4 the satisfiability of deducibility constraints even with negation.
Finally we conclude in Section 5.
1.2 Synthesis of a Loan Origination Process (LOP)
We illustrate how negative constraints are needed to express elaborated policies
such as Separation of Duty by a classical loan origination process example.
Our goal is to synthesize a mediator that selects two bank clerks satisfying the
Separation of Duty policy to manage the client request. Such a problem is
solved automatically by the decision procedure proved in the following sections.
Let us walk through the specification of the different parts of the orchestration
problem.
Inria
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Formal setting. Data are represented by first-order terms defined on a signa-
ture that comprises binary symbols for symmetric and assymetric encryptions
(resp. {|_|}_, {_}_), signature ({_}sig_ ), and pairing (pair). Given a public
key k we write inv (k) its associated private key. For example {a}siginv(k) is the
signature of a by the owner of public key k. For readability we write a.b.c a
term pair (a,pair (b, c)). The binary symbol rel expresses that two agents are
related and is used for defining a Separation of Duty policy. A unary symbol g
is employed to designate participants identity in the “relatives” database.
Client and clerks. The client and the clerks are specified by services with
a security policy, specifying the cryptographic protections and the data and
security tokens, and a business logic that specify the sequence in which the
operations may be invoked. These are compiled into a sequence of protected
messages each service is willing to follow during the orchestration (Fig. 1 and 2).
Client C wants to ask for a loan from a service P , but for this he needs to
get an approval from two banking clerks. He declares his intention by sending
to mediator M a signed by him message containing service name P and the
identity of the client g(C). The mediator should send back the names of two
clerks A and B who will evaluate his request. The client then sends to each
clerk a request containing amount Amnt, his name C and a fresh key Nk which
should be used to encrypt decisions. Each request is encrypted with a public key
of the corresponding clerk (pk(A) or pk(B)). Then the mediator must furnish
the decisions (Ra and Rb) of two clerks each encrypted with the proposed key
Nk and also their signatures. Finally, the client uses these tokens to ask his loan
from P , where pk(P ) is a public key of P .
Clerk A receives a request to participate in a LOP which is conducted by
mediator M . If he accepts, he returns his identity and public key. Then Clerk
receives the client’s request for a loan to evaluate: amount Amnt, client’s name
C and a temporary key K for encrypting his decision. The last is sent back
together with a signature certifying the authenticity of this decision on the
given request.
The client’s non-disclosure policy is given in Fig. 2 and is self-explanatory.
Let us explain the services’ non-disclosure policy. The Clerk’s decision (its last
message) should be unforgeable, thus, it should not be known by the Mediator
before it was sent by the Clerk (first non-disclosure constraint of Fig. 1). The
role clerk played by A can be used by the mediator only if the constraint \g(A)
is satisfied, showing that A is not a relative with any other actor of the protocol,
as client and the other clerk (second non-disclosure constraint of Fig. 1).
Goal service. In contrast with the other services and clients, the goal service
is only described in terms of possible operations and available initial data.
Initial data. Beside his private/public keys and the public keys of potential
partners (e.g. pk (P )) the goal service has access to a relational database
rel(g(a), g(c)), rel(g(b), g(c)), . . . for storing known existing relations be-
tween agents to be checked against conflict of interests.
RR n° 8017
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Clerk’s (A) communications:1
∗ ⇒ A : request.M
A ⇒ M : g(A).pk (A)
M ⇒ A : {Amnt.C.K}pk(A)
A ⇒ M : m1(A,RespA,K,C,Amnt)
Non-disclosure constraints:
1. M cannot deduce the fourth
message before it is sent by A.
2. M cannot deduce g(A) before
the second message is sent by
A.
Figure 1: Clerk’s communications
and non-disclosure constraints
Client’s (C) communications:1
C ⇒ M : {g(C).loan.P}siginv(pk(C))
M ⇒ C : A.B
C ⇒ M : m2(A,Amnt).m2(B,Amnt)
M ⇒ C : m3(A,Ra).m3(B,Rb)
C ⇒ P : m4(pk (P ) , A,B,Ra, Rb)
Non-disclosure constraints:
1. M cannot deduce the amount
Amnt.
2. M cannot deduce A’s decision
Ra.
3. M cannot deduce B’s decision
Rb.
Figure 2: Client’s Communications
and non-disclosure constraints
Composition rules Decomposition rules
x, y → pair (x, y) pair (x, y) → x
pair (x, y) → y x, rel(x, y) → y
x, y → {|x|}y y, {|x|}y → x y, rel(x, y) → x
x, y → {x}y inv (y) , {x}y → x
x, inv (y) → {x}siginv(y) y, {x}siginv(y) → x
Figure 3: Deduction system for the LOP example.
Deduction rules. The access to the database as well as the possible operations
on messages are modeled by a set of deduction rules (formally defined
later). We anticipate on the rest of this paper, and present the rules
specific to this case study grouped into composition and decomposition
rules in Fig. 3.
Mediator synthesis problem. In order to communicate with the services
(here the client, the clerks and the service P ), a mediator has to satisfy a
sequence of constraints expressing that (i) each messagem expected by a service
(denoted ?m) can be deduced from all the previously sent messages m′ (denoted
!m′) and the initial knowledge and (ii) each message w that should not be known
or disclosed (denoted \w and called negative constraint) is not deducible.
The orchestration problem consists in finding a satisfying interleaving of the
constraints imposed by each service. For instance, clerk’s and client’s constraints
Inria
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extracted from Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 are:
Client(C)
∆
= !M {g(C).loan.P}siginv(KC) ?MA.B !Mm2(A,Amnt).m2(B,Amnt)
?Mm3(A,Ra).m3(B,Rb) \MAmnt \MRA \MRB
!Pm4(pk (P ) , A,B,Ra, Rb)
Clerk(A)
∆
= ?request.M \Mg(A) !Mg(A).pk (A) ?M {Amnt.C.K}pk(A)
\Mm1(A,RespA,K,C,Amnt) !Mm1(A,RespA,K,C,Amnt)
If it exists our procedure outputs a solution which can be translated automat-
ically into a mediator. Note, for example, that without the negative constraint
\g(A) a synthesized mediator might accept any clerk identity and that could
violate the Separation of Duty policy.
2 Derivations and constraint systems
In our setting messages are terms generated or obtained according to some
elementary rules called deduction rules. A derivation is a sequence of deduction
rules applied by a mediator to build new messages. The goal of the synthesis is
specified by a constraint system, i.e. a sequence of terms labelled by symbols
!,? or \, respectively sent, received, or unknown at some step of the process.
2.1 Terms and substitutions
Let X be a set of variables, F be a set of function symbols and C a set of
constants. The set of terms T is the minimal set containing X , C and if
t1, . . . , tk ∈ T then f(t1, . . . , tk) ∈ T for any f ∈ F with arity k. The set
of subterms of a term t is denoted Sub(t) and is the minimal set containing t
such that f(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Sub(t) implies t1, . . . , tn ∈ Sub(t) for f ∈ F . We de-
note Vars (t) the set X ∩ Sub(t). A term t is ground is Vars (t) = ∅. We denote
Tg the set of ground terms.
A substitution σ is an idempotent mapping from X to T . It is ground if it
is a mapping from X to Tg. The application of a substitution σ on a term t is
denoted tσ and is equal to the term t where all variables x have been replaced by
the term xσ. We say that a substitution σ is injective on a set of terms T , iff for
all p, q ∈ T pσ = qσ implies p = q. The domain of σ (denoted by dom (σ)) is set:
{x ∈ X : xσ 6= x}. The image of σ is img (σ) = {xσ : x ∈ dom (σ)}. Given two
substitutions σ, δ, the substitution σδ has for domain dom (σ) ∪ dom (δ) and is
defined by xσδ = (xσ)δ. If dom (σ) ∩ dom (δ) = ∅ we write σ ∪ δ instead of σδ.
A unification system U is a finite set of equations {pi =? qi}1≤i≤n where
pi, qi ∈ T . A substitution σ is an unifier of U or equivalently satisfies U iff for
1We have employed the following abbreviations for messages:
m1(A,Resp,K,Ct, S) = {h(A.S.Ct.Resp)}siginv(pk(A)) .{|Resp|}K
m2(A,S) = {S.C.Nk}pk(A)
m3(A,R) = m1(A,R,Nk, C,Amnt)
m4(K0, A,B,R1, R2) = {Amnt.C.A.R1.B.R2}K0 .m3(A,R1).m3(B,R2)
RR n° 8017
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all i = 1, . . . , n, piσ = qiσ. Any satisfiable unification system U admits a most
general unifier mgu (U), unique modulo variable renaming, and such that for
any unifier σ of U there exists a substitution τ such that σ = mgu (U) τ . Wlog
we assume in the rest of this paper that Vars (img (mgu (U))) ⊆ Vars (U), i.e.,
the most general unifier does not introduce new variables.
A sequence s is indexed by [1, . . . , n] with n ∈ N. We write |s| the length
of s, ∅ the empty sequence, s[i] the ith element of s, s[m : n] the sequence
s[m], . . . , s[n] and s, s′ the concatenation of two sequences s and s′. We write
e ∈ s and E ⊆ s for, respectively, ∃i : s[i] = e and ∀e ∈ E, e ∈ s.
2.2 Deduction systems
The new values created by the mediator are constants in a subset Cmed of C.
We assume that both Cmed and C \ Cmed are infinite. Given l1, . . . , ln, r ∈ T ,
the notation l1, . . . , ln → r denotes a deduction rule if Var(r) ⊆
⋃n
i=1 Var(li).
A deduction is a ground instance of a deduction rule. A deduction system is a
set of deduction rules that contains a finite set of deduction rules in addition to
all nonce creation rules → n (one for every n ∈ Cmed) and all reception rules
?t (one for every t ∈ T ). All rules but the reception rules are called standard
rules. The deduction system describes the abilities of the mediator to process
the messages. In the rest of this section we fix an arbitrary deduction system
D. We denote by l ∗→ r any rule and l→ r any standard rule.
2.3 Derivations and localizations
A derivation is a sequence of deductions, including receptions of messages from
available services, performed by the mediator. Given a sequence of deductions
E = (li ∗→ ri)i=1,...,m we denote RE (i) the set {rj : j ≤ i}.
Definition 2.1 (Derivation). A sequence of deductions D = (li ∗→ ri)i=1,...,m
is a derivation if for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, li ⊆ RD (i− 1).
Given a derivation D we define NextD(i) = min({|D|+ 1} ∪ {j : j >
i and D[j] =?tj}). The explicit knowledge of the mediator is the set of terms
it has already deduced, and its implicit knowledge is the set of terms it can
deduce. If the former is K we denote the latter Der(K). A derivation D is a
proof of s ∈ Der(K) if ?r ∈ D implies r ∈ K, and D[|D|] = l ∗→ t. Thus, we
have:
Der(K) = {t : ∃D derivation s.t. ?r ∈ D implies r ∈ K, and D[|D|] = l→ t}
2.4 Constraint systems
Definition 2.2 (Constraint system). A constraint system S is a sequence of
constraints where each constraint has one of three forms (where t is a term):
1. ?t, denoting a message reception by an available service or a client,
2. !t, denoting a message emission by an available service or a client,
Inria
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Figure 4: A constraint system and a compliant derivation
3. \t, a negative constraint, denoting that the mediator must not be able to
deduce t at this point;
and that satisfies the following properties for any 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|:
Origination: if S[i] =!ti then Vars (ti) ⊆
⋃
j<i Vars ({tj : S[j] =?tj});
Determination: if S[i] = \ti then Vars (ti) ⊆
⋃
j Vars ({tj : S[j] =?tj}).
Origination means that every unknown in a service’s state originates from
previous input by the mediator. Determination means that negative constraints
are on messages determined by a service’s state at the end of its execution.
In the rest of this paper S (and decorations thereof) denotes a constraint
system. An index i is a send (resp. a receive) index if S[i] =!t (resp. S[i] =?t)
for some term t. If i1, . . . , ik is the sequence of all send (resp. receive) indices in
S we denote Out(S) (resp. In(S)) the sequence S[i1], . . . ,S[ik]. We note that
the origination and determination properties imply Var(S) = Var(In(S)). Given
1 ≤ i ≤ |S| we denote prevS(i) to be max({0} ∪ {j : j ≤ i and S[j] =!tj}).
Definition 2.3 (Solution of a constraint system). A ground substitution σ is a
solution of S, and we denote σ |= S, if dom (σ) = Var(S) and
1. if S[i] =?t then tσ ∈ Der({tjσ : j ≤ prevS(i) and S[j] =!tj})
2. if S[i] = \t then tσ /∈ Der({tjσ : j ≤ prevS(i) and S[j] =!tj})
Definition 2.4 (Compliant derivations). Let σ be a ground substitution with
dom (σ) = Var(S). A derivation D is (S, σ)-compliant if there exists a strictly
increasing bijective mapping α from the send indices of S to the set {j : D[j] =?r}
such that S[i] =!t implies D[α(i)] =?tσ.
An example of (S, σ)-compliant derivation is shown in Figure 4. Since a
sequence of receptions is a derivation, we note that for every ground substitution
σ with dom (σ) = Var(In(S)) there exists at least one compliant derivation D.
Definition 2.5 (Proof of a solution). Let σ be a ground substitution. A deriva-
tion D is a proof of σ |= S, and we denote D,σ, α ` S, if:
1. D is (S, σ)-compliant with the mapping α and
2. if S[i] =?t there is j < NextD(α(prevS(i))) such that D[i] = l ∗→ tσ and
3. if S[i] = \t then tσ /∈ Der({tjσ : j ≤ prevS(i) and S[j] =!tj}).
RR n° 8017
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In Figure 4, if σ is a solution of S and, for example, t1σ = r2, t2σ /∈ Der(∅),
t4σ = r4, t6σ /∈ Der({r3, r6}) and t7σ = r8 then D is a proof of σ |= S.
Let us prove that if σ |= S then there is a proof D,σ, α ` S.
Definition 2.6 (Maximal derivation). Let T be a finite set of terms and σ be a
ground substitution with dom (σ) = Var(T ). A derivation D is (T, σ)-maximal
iff for every t ∈ Sub(T ), tσ ∈ Der(RD (i)) implies tσ ∈ RD (NextD(i)− 1).
First we prove that maximal derivations are natural proof candidates of
σ |= S.
Lemma 1. Let σ be a ground substitution with dom (σ) = Var(S) and D be a
(S, σ)-compliant (Sub(S), σ)-maximal derivation. Then σ |= S iff for all i
• if S[i] =?t then there exists j < NextD(α(prevS(i))) : D[j] = l ∗→ tσ and
• if S[i] = \t then for all j < NextD(α(prevS(i))) : D[j] 6= l ∗→ tσ.
In the next lemma we show that any (T, σ)-maximal derivation D may be
extended into a (T ′, σ′)-maximal derivation for an arbitrary extension T ′, σ′ of
T, σ by adding into D only standard deductions.
Lemma 2. Let σ be a ground substitution with dom (σ) = Var(S). Let T1, T2
be two sets of terms such that T1 ⊆ T2, and σ1, σ2 be two substitutions such
that dom (σ1) = Var(T1) and dom (σ2) = Var(T2) \ Var(T1). If D is a (T1, σ1)-
maximal (S, σ)-compliant derivation in which no term is deduced twice by a
standard rule, then there exists a (T2, σ1∪σ2)-maximal (S, σ)-compliant deriva-
tion D′ in which no term is deduced twice by a standard rule such that every
deduction whose right-hand side is in Sub(T1)σ1 occurs in D′ iff it occurs in D.
Proof. Let i1, . . . , ik be the indices of the non-standard rules in D, let D[ij ] =
?tij , and let for 0 ≤ j ≤ k Dj = D[ij+1 : ij+1−1] with i0 = 0 and ik+1 = |D|+1.
That is, D = D0, !ti1 , D1, !ti2 , D2, . . .!tik , Dk. Noting that dom (σ1)∩dom (σ2) =
∅ let σ′ = σ1 ∪ σ2.
For each t ∈ Sub(T2) such that tσ′ ∈ Der(ti1 , . . . , tik) let it be minimal
such that tσ′ ∈ Der(ti1 , . . . , tit), and let E0t be a proof of this fact, and Et be
a sequence of standard deductions obtained by removing every non-standard
deduction from E0t .
For 0 ≤ j ≤ k letD′j be the sequence of standard deduction stepsDj , Es1 , . . . , Esp
for all sm ∈ Sub(T2)σ′ \ Sub(T1)σ′ such that ism = j in which every rule of
Es1 , . . . , Esp that deduces a term previously deduced in the sequence or for
some m ≤ j deduced in D′m or in D[im] is removed.
Let D′ = D′0, ?ti1 , D′1, . . . , ?tik , D′k. We have deleted in each E
0
t only deduc-
tions whose right-hand side occurs before in D′, and thus D′ is a derivation.
Since the D′i contains only standard deductions, we can see that D′ is (S, σ)-
compliant.
Since D is (T1, σ1)-maximal and no term is deduced twice in D we note
that, for t ∈ T1, no standard deduction of tσ1 from a sequence Dj is deleted.
Furthermore we note that standard deductions of terms T2σ2 that are also in
Inria
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T1σ1 are deleted by construction and by the maximality of D. Thus a deduction
whose right-hand side is in Sub(T1)σ1 is in D′ iff it occurs in D.
By construction D′ is (T2, σ′)-maximal and no term is deduced twice by
standard deductions.
Taking T1 = ∅, T2 = Sub(S), and σ2 = σ, Lemma 2 implies that for every
substitution σ of domain Var(S) there exists a (S, σ)-compliant (Sub(S), σ)-
maximal derivation D. By Lemma 1 if σ |= S then D is a proof of σ |= S. Since
the converse is trivial, it suffices to search proofs maximal wrt T ⊇ Sub(S).
3 Subterm deduction system
3.1 Definition and main property
We say that a deduction system is a subterm deduction system whenever each
deduction rule which is not a nonce creation or a message reception is either:
1. x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn) for a function symbol f ;
2. l1, . . . , ln → r for some terms l1, . . . , ln, r such that r ∈
⋃n
i=1 Sub(li).
A composition rule is either a message reception, a nonce creation, or a rule
of the first type. A deduction rule is otherwise a decomposition rule. Reacha-
bility problems for deduction systems with a convergent equational theory are
reducible to the satisfiability of a constraint system in the empty theory for a
deduction system in our setting [16, 13]. If furthermore the equational theory
is subterm [5] the reduction is to a subterm deduction system as just defined
above.
Now we show that if D,σ, α ` S, a term s ∈ Sub(D) is either the instance
of a non-variable subterm of Out(S) or deduced by a standard composition.
Lemma 3. Let σ be a ground substitution such that σ |= S. If D is a proof of
σ |= S such that no term is deduced twice in D by standard rules and s is a term
such that s ∈ Sub(D) and s /∈ (Sub(Out(S)) \ X )σ then there exists an index i
in D such that D[i] = l→ s is a composition rule and s /∈ Sub(RD (i− 1)).
Proof. First we note that by definition of subterm deduction systems for any
decomposition rule l → r we have a) r ∈ Sub(l), and b) for any composition
rule l→ r we have l ⊂ Sub(r) and Sub(r) \ Sub(l) = {r}.
Let D be a proof of σ |= S, and let i be minimal such that D[i] = lr ∗→ r
with s ∈ Sub(r). Since lr ⊆ RD (i− 1), the minimality of i implies s ∈ Sub(r) \
Sub(lr).
Thus by a) D[i] cannot be a decomposition.
If D[i] =?r then by the (S, σ)-compliance of D we have S[α−1(i)] =!t with
tσ = r. We have s ∈ Sub(r) = Sub(tσ) = Sub(t)σ ∪ Sub(Vars (t)σ).
If s ∈ (Sub(Out(S)) \ X )σ we are done, otherwise there exists y ∈ Vars (t)
with s ∈ Sub(yσ). By the origination property, there exists k < α−1(i) such
that S[k] =?t′ with y ∈ Vars (t′). Since D,σ, α ` S and k < α−1(i) there
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exists j < i such that D[j] = lj → t′σ. The minimality of i is contradicted by
s ∈ Sub(t′σ).
Therefore, D[i] = lr → r is a standard composition rule. As a consequence,
Sub(r) \ Sub(lr) = {r}. Since s ∈ Sub(r) \ Sub(lr), we finally obtain s = r.
3.2 Locality
Subterm deduction systems are not necessarily local in the sense of [18]. How-
ever we prove in this subsection that given σ, there exists a finite extension T
of Sub(S) and an extension σ′ of σ of domain Var(T ) and a (T, σ′)-maximal
derivation D in which every deduction relevant to the proof of σ |= S is liftable
into a deduction between terms in T . Let us first precise the above statements.
Definition 3.1 (Localization set). A set of terms T localizes a derivation D =
(li ∗→ ri)1≤i≤m for a substitution σ of domain Var(T ) if for every 1 ≤ i ≤
m if D[i] is a standard rule and there exists t ∈ Sub(T ) \ X such that tσ =
ri, there exists t1, . . . , tn ∈ Sub(T ) such that {t1σ, . . . , tnσ} ⊆ RD (i− 1) and
t1, . . . , tn → t is the instance of a standard deduction rule.
First, we prove that for subterm deduction systems, every proof D of σ |= S
is localized by a set T of DAG size linear in the DAG size of S.
Lemma 4. If σ is a ground substitution such that σ |= S there exists T ⊇
Sub(S) of size linear in |Sub(S)|, a substitution τ of domain Var(T ) \ Var(S)
and a (T, σ∪τ)-maximal and (S, σ)-compliant derivation localized by T for σ∪τ .
Proof. By Lemma 2 applied with T1 = ∅, T2 = Sub(S), σ1 = ∅, σ2 = σ, and D0
the (S, σ)-compliant derivation that has no standard deductions, there exists a
(Sub(S), σ)-maximal (S, σ)-compliant derivation D in which no term is deduced
twice by a standard deduction. From now on we let T0 = Sub(S).
Let {li → ri}1≤i≤n be the set of decompositions inD, and {(Li → Ri, τi)}1≤i≤n
be a set of decomposition rules and ground substitutions such that for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n we have Liτi → Riτi = li → ri. Since no term in D is deduced
twice by a standard deduction, by Lemma 3 we have n ≤ |Sub(Out(S))|.
Modulo variable renaming we may assume that i 6= j implies dom (τi) ∩
dom (τj) = ∅, and thus that τ =
⋃n
i=1 τi is defined on T1 =
⋃n
i=1(Sub(Li) ∪
Sub(Ri)). Note that the size of T1 is bounded by M × |Sub(Out(S))|, where M
is the maximal size of a decomposition rule belonging to the deduction system.
Let T = T0 ∪ T1 and, noting that these substitutions are defined on non-
intersecting domains, let σ′ = σ ∪ τ . By construction |T | ≤ (M + 1)× |Sub(S)|.
By Lemma 2 there exists a (S, σ)-compliant derivation D′ which is (T, σ′)-
maximal and such that every deduction of a term in T0σ that occurs in D also
occurs in D′ and no term is deduced twice in D′ by a standard deduction.
Let l → r be a deduction in D′ which does not appear in D. Since D is
(T0, σ)-maximal we have r /∈ Sub(T0)σ, and thus r /∈ Sub(Out(S))σ. Since no
term is deduced twice in D′ by Lemma 3 this deduction must be a composition.
Let us prove D′ is (T, σ′)-localized. By definition of composition rules, every
composition that deduces a term tσ′ with t ∈ Sub(T ) \ Var(T ) has a left-hand
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side t1σ′, . . . , tkσ′ with t1, . . . , tk ∈ Sub(T ) and t1, . . . , tk → t is an instance of a
composition rule. By the preceding paragraph every decomposition in D′ occurs
inD and thus by construction has its left-hand side in T1σ′ which was previously
built in D and is an instance of some Li → Ri such that Sub(Li∪{Ri}) ⊆ T1 ⊆
T .
Thus every deduction whose right-hand side is in (Sub(T ) \ Var(T ))σ′ has
its left-hand side in Sub(T )σ′, and thus D′ is localized by T for σ′.
We prove now that to solve constraint systems one can first guess equalities
between terms in T and then solve constraint systems without variables. The
guess of equalities is correct wrt a solution σ if terms in T that have the same
instance by σ are syntactically equal. We characterize these guesses as follows.
Definition 3.2 (One-to-one localizations). A set of terms T one-to-one localizes
a derivation D for a ground substitution σ if σ is injective on Sub(T ) and T
localizes D for σ.
In Lemma 7 we prove that once equalities between variables are correctly
guessed there exists a one-to-one localization of a maximal proof D.
Lemma 5. Let T be a set of terms such that T = Sub(T ), σ be a ground
substitution defined on Vars (T ), U = {p =? q : p, q ∈ T ∧ pσ = qσ} be a unifi-
cation system and θ be its most general idempotent unifier with Vars (img (θ)) ⊆
Vars (U). Then for any term t, tθσ = tσ.
Proof. Let us show ∀x ∈ Vars (T ) , xσ = xθσ. Note that this trivially holds if
xθ = x. Thus we consider case xθ 6= x.
Since U contains all equations p =? p for p ∈ Sub(T ) = T , we have Sub(T ) =
Sub(U). From the idempotency of θ (∀y ∈ Vars (U) , yθθ = yθ), we get ∀y ∈
Vars (img (θ)) , yθ = y.
As σ is evidently a unifier of U , there exists a substitution τ such that σ = θτ
Therefore, yσ = yθτ = yτ , i.e. yσ = yτ for all y ∈ Vars (img (θ)). Thus, for any
x ∈ Vars (T ), xθσ = xθτ = xσ.
Consequently, for any term t we have tσ = tθσ.
Lemma 6. Let U be a unification system and θ = mgu (U) an idempotent
most general unifier with Vars (img (θ)) ⊆ Vars (U). Then ∀p ∈ Sub(img (θ))
∃q ∈ Sub(U) : p = qθ.
Proof. The case where p ∈ X is trivial, since Vars (img (σ)) ⊆ Vars (U) and
we can take q = p. Otherwise, suppose that p ∈ Sub(xθ|x ∈ dom (θ)) \ X
is such that ∀q ∈ Sub(U) p 6= qθ. Let z be a fresh variable. Let θ′ =
{x 7→ (xθ)|p← [z : x ∈ dom (θ)}. Let us denote the height of a term t by ht (t),
and a subterm of t at position l by t[l] and the set of all positions in t by t[].
Let us prove that ∀u, v ∈ Sub(U) uθ = vθ =⇒ uθ′ = vθ′.
• If u, v ∈ X then the statement is true by definition.
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• If, w.l.o.g., u ∈ X but v /∈ X . Then for any l ∈ v[] we have (uθ)[l] = (v[l])θ.
Since v[l] ∈ Sub(U) we get (uθ)[l] 6= p (as we took such p that ∀q ∈ Sub(U)
p 6= qθ), and therefore, (v[l])θ 6= p. Thus, (vθ)|p←[z = vθ′. Therefore,
uθ′ = (uθ)|p← [z = (vθ)|p←[z = vθ′.
• If u = f(u1, . . . , uk)∧v = g(v1, . . . , vm) then f = g,m = k and for all i ≤ k
we have viθ = uiθ. It is enough to prove that viθ′ = uiθ′. Let us prove
this case by induction on min(ht (u) ,ht (v)). For the basis of induction,
we have that either ui ∈ X or vi ∈ X (otherwise the basis is not minimal)
and we have proved already that viθ = uiθ =⇒ viθ′ = uiθ′. Suppose
the statement is true for min(ht (u) ,ht (v)) ≤ n. For min(ht (u) ,ht (v)) =
n+ 1 we have ht (uiθ) ≤ n, ht (viθ) ≤ n and uiθ = viθ for all i. Then by
induction supposition and two cases considered before we have uiθ′ = viθ′.
Thus, ∀u, v ∈ Sub(U)uθ = vθ =⇒ uθ′ = vθ′, i.e. θ′ is a unifier of U .
Moreover, for all x ∈ dom (θ) , xθ = (xθ′)γ, where γ = {z 7→ p}.
Since θ is a most general unifier, we have p ∈ X which contradicts to p ∈
Sub(xθ|x ∈ dom (θ)) \ X .
Lemma 7. Let S be a constraint system, σ be a ground substitution such that
σ |= S.
Then there exists a set of terms T , a substitution τ of domain Var(T ) \
Var(S), a substitution θ and a (Sθ, σ)-compliant derivation D such that
• D is (T, σ ∪ τ)-maximal and one-to-one localized by T for σ ∪ τ
• σ ∪ τ = θ(σ ∪ τ)
• Sub(Sθ) ⊆ T
• T and θ of size linear in |Sub(S)|
Proof. Under the same assumptions, by Lemma 4, there exists T0 ⊇ Sub(S) of
size linear in |Sub(S)| and τ of domain Var(T0) \ Var(S) such that there exists
a (T0, σ ∪ τ)-maximal and (S, σ)-compliant derivation D which is localized by
T0 for the same substitution σ′ = σ ∪ τ .
Let U = {t =? t′ : t, t′ ∈ Sub(T0) and tσ′ = t′σ′}. The unification system U
has a unifier σ′ and thus has a most general solution θ. By Lemma 5, σ′ = θσ′.
Let T = Sub(T0)θ.
Since Sub(S) ⊆ T0 we have Sub(Sθ) ⊆ Sub(T0θ). Since θ is a most general
unifier of U and Sub(U) = Sub(T0) we have Sub(T0θ) = Sub(T0)θ by Lemma 6.
This implies (i) Sub(Sθ) ⊆ T , (ii) θ is of linear size on |Sub(T0)| and thus on
|Sub(S)|, and (iii) T is of linear size on |Sub(S)|. Moreover, as σ′ = θσ′ we
have Sub(T )σ′ = Sub(T0)σ′ and thus from D is (T0, σ′)-maximal follows D is
(T, σ′)-maximal.
Assume there exists t, t′ ∈ Sub(T ) such that tσ′ = t′σ′ but t 6= t′. Since
T = Sub(T0θ) there exists t0, t′0 ∈ Sub(T0) such that t0θ 6= t′0θ but t0θσ′ = t′0θσ′.
From σ′ = θσ′ we have an existence of t0, t′0 ∈ Sub(T0) such that t0θ 6= t′0θ but
t0σ
′ = t′0σ
′. This contradicts the fact that θ satisfies U .
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Finally, from D is (S, σ)-compliant and σ = θσ we have D is (Sθ, σ)-
compliant.
3.3 Milestone sequence
In addition to retrace the deduction steps performed in D we want to track
which terms relevant to S are deduced in T , and in which order.
Definition 3.3 (Milestone sequence). Let T be a set of terms and σ be a ground
substitution. We say that ~T is the (T, σ)-milestone sequence of a derivation
D = (li → ri)1≤i≤m if ~T = t1, . . . , tn is a sequence of maximal length in which
each ti is either of the form → t or of the form ?t, with t ∈ Sub(T ) and there
exists a strictly increasing function α : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . ,m} such that for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have:
1. if ~T [i] =?t then D[α(i)] =?tσ;
2. if ~T [i] =→ t then D[α(i)] = li → tσ is a standard deduction rule;
Lemma 8. Let σ |= S, T ⊇ Sub(S) and σ′ be an extension of σ on Vars (T ).
Let D be (T, σ′)-maximal derivation one-to-one localized by T for σ′. Let ~T be a
(T, σ′)-milestone sequence. Then for any i for any x ∈ Vars
(
~T [i]
)
there exists
j < i such that ~T [j] =→ x.
Proof. If x ∈ Vars
(
~T [i]
)
then there exists corresponding deduction D[j] that
deduces term ~T [i]σ′. Then by Lemma 3 there exists k < j such that D[j]
deduces by a standard rule xσ′. From the injectivity of σ follows that x is the
only term of Sub(T ) having σ′ image equal xσ′. Thus, by definition of milestone
sequence, there exists m < i such that ~T [m] =→ x.
4 Deciding constraint systems
From now we suppose that the considered subterm deduction system con-
tains a rule x1, x2 → f(x1, x2), where f is a function symbol with arity 2 that
does not occur in any other rule.
Theorem 1. Let σ such that σ |= S, T such that T ⊇ Sub(S) and σ′ an
extension of σ on Vars (T ). Let D be a (T, σ′)-maximal derivation one-to-one
localized by T for σ′ in which no term is deduced twice by a standard rule.
Then there exists a solution τ of S of size polynomial in |Sub(T )|.
Proof. First let us define a replacement of a term q by term p in t denoted as
t|q←[p as follows: t|q←[p is the term is obtained from t by simultaneous replacing
all occurrences of q in t by p. For a substitution σ = {x 7→ tx : x ∈ dom (σ)}
we define σ|q←[p = {x 7→ (tx|q←[p) : x ∈ dom (σ)}
Let ~T be a (T, σ′)-milestone sequence for D.
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Let ~M = m1, . . . ,mn be the maximal increasing sequence such that for any
i = 1, . . . , n, ~T [mi] =?tmi . We put also m0 = 0 and mn+1 = |~T | + 1. Let
~Ti = ~T [mi + 1 : mi+1 − 1].
Goal. We will prove the existence of a ground substitution τ ′, set of terms
T ′ ⊇ T and a derivation D′ which is (S, τ)-compliant, (T ′, τ)-maximal (where
τ = τ ′|Vars(S) is of a linear size on Sub(T )) and is one-to-one localized by T ′
with τ ′ such that its (T, τ ′)-milestone sequence coincides with ~T .
If it is proved, by Lemma 1 we can show that τ |= S.
Build T ′. Let X be the set of variables of ~T whose σ′-instance are not
derivable from the empty knowledge. By Lemma 8 each variable x of Vars
(
~T
)
appears first as → x in ~T . Therefore, we may put X = {x1, . . . , xu} =
Vars
(
~T
)
\
{
x :→ x ∈ ~T0
}
. Let for each x ∈ X, let x¯ be a new fresh variable
(corresponding to x) and let X¯ = {x¯ : x ∈ X}. Finally, we put T ′ = T ∪ X¯.
Build τ ′. Let τ ′ be a ground substitution defined as follows:
• for any x ∈ X, x¯τ ′ is a nonce nx and xτ ′ = f(tmiτ ′, nx), where → x
appears first in ~Ti (note that by Lemma 8 for any y ∈ Vars (tmi), → y
appears first time at position before mi in ~T and thus τ ′ is correctly
defined);
• for any y ∈ Vars
(
~T0
)
, yτ ′ = ny;
• 2for any z ∈ Vars (T ) \ Vars
(
~T
)
, zτ ′ = az, where az is a fresh constant
from A \ Cmed not appearing in Sub(T ).
We can see that xτ is of polynomial size on |Sub(S)| for any x ∈ Vars (T ).
Show τ ′ is injective on Sub(T ′). Suppose the contrary, let p, q ∈ Sub(T ′) be
a pair with minimal size of pτ ′ and having pτ ′ = qτ ′, while p 6= q. If neither p
nor q is a variable, then this contradicts the minimality of pτ ′ (we can choose
subterms of p and q satisfying the choice criteria). If both are variables, then
it is not possible by the construction of τ ′. W.l.o.g. let p ∈ X and q /∈ X . The
case where pτ ′ is a nonce or another constant is impossible; thus pτ ′ = f(tij , nx)
and q = f(u, x¯) (since by construction for every nonce nx there exists only one
variable x¯ such that x¯τ ′ = nx and nx /∈ Sub(T ′)). But again, by construction
(note that x¯ was a fresh variable), the only term in Sub(T ′) having x¯ as a
subterm is x¯, thus q ∈ X : contradiction. ♦
Build a replacement to pass from τ ′ to σ′. Let δ be the replacement
δ = |{xτ ′←[xσ′ : x∈Vars(T )}. Then τ ′δ = σ′ on Vars (T ). Moreover, from the
property we have just proven follows that for any t ∈ Sub(T ′), we have (tτ ′)δ =
t(τ ′δ) and for t ∈ Sub(T ), we have (tτ ′)δ = tσ′. Note also that (xτ ′)δ = xτ ′ for
any x ∈ X¯.
Build (S, τ)-compliant derivation D′ localized by T ′ with τ ′. Let
D′0 =→ nx1 , . . . ,→ nxu . Let D′1 be a sequence of rules of length |~T | such that
2We note that in practice Vars (T ) \ Vars
(
~T
)
= ∅ if we see how T is constructed in
Lemma 7.
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for any i ≤ |~T |:
• if ~T [i] =?t then D′1[i] =?tτ ′;
• if ~T [i] =→ x and x ∈ X then D′1[i] = nx, tmjτ ′ → xτ ′, where→ x appears
first in ~Tj ;
• if ~T [i] =→ y and y ∈ Vars
(
~T0
)
then D′1[i] =→ yτ ′;
• if ~T [i] =→ t and t /∈ X then since D is one-to-one localized by T , there
exists t1, . . . , tk such that ?tj ∈ ~T [1 : i − 1] or →tj ∈ ~T [1 : i − 1] for
j = 1, . . . , k and t1, . . . , tk → t is a deduction rule. Thus, we put D′1[i] =
t1τ
′, . . . , tkτ ′ → tτ ′.
We defineD′ = D′0, D′1. Note that RD′0 (|D′0|) = X¯τ ′ and for any i, RD′1 (i) =
~T [1 : i]τ ′. Thus, by the construction D′ is a derivation which is (S, τ)-compliant
and localized by T ′ for τ ′. Moreover, it is one-to-one localized since τ ′ is injective
on Sub(T ′).
We have by construction of D′ that its (T ′, τ ′)-milestone sequence is ~T ′ =→
x¯1, . . . ,→ x¯u, ~T . Moreover, |D′| = |~T ′|.
Show that D′ is (T ′, τ ′)-maximal. That is, for any t ∈ Sub(T ′) if tτ ′ ∈
Der(RD′ (i)) then tτ ′ ∈ RD′ (NextD′(i)− 1).
The case t ∈ X¯ is trivial, since X¯τ ′ is deduced at the very beginning of D′.
Suppose that there an exists index j and term t ∈ Sub(T ) such that tτ ′ ∈
Der(tm1τ ′, . . . , tmjτ ′) but tτ ′ /∈ RD′ (u+mj+1 − 1), i.e. tτ ′ is not deduced be-
fore the next to j non-standard rule inD′. In this case, tσ′ /∈ Der(tm1σ′, . . . , tmjσ′),
otherwise by maximality tσ′ would be deduced before (j + 1)-th non-standard
rule of D and by construction, tτ ′ would also appear in D′ before (j + 1)-th
nonstandard rule of D′.
Let j be such a minimal index. Note that Vars (t) ⊆ Vars
(
~T
)
, otherwise
by construction tτ ′ would contain some fresh constants from A\ Cmed and thus
would not be derivable from ti1τ ′, . . . , tijτ ′. Let m′ (resp. m) be the maximal
index such thatD′[1 : m′] (resp. D[1 : m]) contains exactly j non-standard rules.
Thus, tτ ′ ∈ Der(RD′ (m′)) and tσ′ /∈ Der(RD (m)). Note that tτ ′ /∈ RD′ (m′)
(otherwise it would imply tσ′ ∈ RD (m)). Let E′ be a minimal sequence of
standard rules such that D′[1 : m′], E′ is a derivation ending with a standard
deduction of tτ ′. W.l.o.g., we suppose that E′[1 : |E′|−1] does not deduce terms
from Sub(T )τ ′ (otherwise, if t′τ ′ is deduced in E′[1 : |E′| − 1] with t′ ∈ Sub(T )
then (i) either t′σ′ ∈ Der(RD (m)) and by maximality of D t′σ′ ∈ RD (m)
which contradicts the minimality of E′ (ii) or t′σ′ /∈ Der(RD (m)) which implies
t′σ′ /∈ RD (m); thus by construction t′τ ′ /∈ RD′ (m′) and we could chose t′
instead of t).
Let S ′ be a constraint system obtained from S by removing all constraints
after j-th !-constraint and removing all \-constraints. By construction, D′[1 :
m′], E′ is a proof of τ |= S ′ and thus we can apply Lemma 3, i.e. all rules of
E′[1 : |E′| − 1] are compositions.
Suppose that t is a variable. Note that tτ ′ is not a nonce, otherwise by defi-
nition of τ ′, t ∈ ~T0 and thus tσ′ ∈ RD (m). Therefore, tτ ′ = f(tmkτ ′, nt), where
RR n° 8017
18 T.Avanesov, Y.Chevalier, M.Rusinowitch, M.Turuani
→ t first appears in ~Tk. Since t is a variable, the last rule of E′ is also a compo-
sition, more precisely tmkτ ′, nt → f(tmkτ ′, nt). If k ≤ j, by construction of τ ′,
tσ′ must be in RD (m). Thus, k > j. Since D′[1 : m′], E′ is a derivation, either
tmkτ
′ ∈ RE′ (|E′| − 1) or tmkτ ′ ∈ RD′ (m′). The former contradicts the choice
of E′. The latter case implies tmkσ′ ∈ RD (m) ⊆ Der(tm1σ′, . . . , tmjσ′) and
thus, as j < k we have that Der(tm1σ′, . . . , tmkσ′) = Der(tm1σ′, . . . , tmk−1σ′).
Thus, ~Tk must be empty, otherwise it contradicts the maximality of D and that
no term is deduced twice by a standard rule in D. This contradicts that → t
appears first in Tk.
Thus, t /∈ X .
Let us build a sequence of rules E such that E[i] = E′[i]δ and show that
D[1 : m], D′0, E is a proof of tσ′ ∈ Der(tm1σ′, . . . , tmjσ′).
Let us show that E′[i]δ is a rule.
• If E′[i] =→ o is a nonce generation, then o /∈ img (τ ′) due to the mini-
mality of E′ and since all variables of T ′ that are mapped to nonces by τ ′
are deduced in D′ before the first non-standard rule. Thus oδ = o and we
have E[i] =→ o
• If E′[i] is another composition, then E′[i] = t′1, . . . , t′v → h(t′1, . . . , t′v).
Since t /∈ X and E′[1 : |E′| − 1] does not deduce terms from Sub(T )τ ′
we have h(t′1, . . . , t′v) 6= xτ ′ for any x ∈ Vars (T ′). Thus, h(t′1, . . . , t′v)δ =
h(t′1δ, . . . , t
′
vδ) and we have t′1δ, . . . , t′vδ → h(t′1δ, . . . , t′vδ) is a composition
rule.
• If E′[i] is a decomposition, then since no decomposition rule contains f ,
the value of xτ ′ (which is a fresh nonce or has f as a root symbol) may be
replaced with any other term and we still obtain an instance of the same
decomposition rule, i.e. E′[i]δ is an instance of a decomposition rule.
As noted above, since ∀r ∈ Sub(T ), (rτ ′)δ = rσ′ and D′0δ = D′0 by construc-
tion we have RD′ (m′) δ ⊆ RD (m) ∪
{
xτ ′ : x ∈ X¯}. Thus, D[1 : m], D′0, E is a
derivation deducing tτ ′δ = tσ′, i.e. tσ′ ∈ Der(ti1σ′, . . . , tijσ′). Contradiction.
Therefore, D′ is (T ′, τ ′)-maximal.
Conclusion. Since Sub(S) ⊆ T ′, and τ ′ is injective on Sub(T ′), we have
that by construction of D′, for any term t ∈ Sub(S), tσ′ is deduced before j-th
non-standard rule of D (resp. deduced in D) if and only if tτ ′ is deduced before
j-th non-standard rule of D′ (resp. deduced in D′). Therefore, since σ |= S and
D is (S, σ)-compliant and (Sub(S), σ)-maximal and since D′ is (S, τ)-compliant
and (Sub(S), τ)-maximal we may use twice Lemma 1 and obtain that τ satisfies
S.
Corollary 1. Let S be a constraint system. S is satisfiable, if and only if there
exists a solution σ′ of S with polynomial size w.r.t. |Sub(S)|.
Proof. (⇐) is trivial, since σ′ |= S. Consider (⇒). Let σ |= S. By Lemma 7
there exists a set of terms T , a substitution θ both with the size linear in |Sub(S)|
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and an extension γ of σ and (T, γ)-maximal (Sθ, σ)-compliant derivation D one-
to-one localized by T for γ. We also have γ = θγ (which implies σ = θσ). Thus
σ satisfies Sθ.
From the same lemma we have Sub(Sθ) ⊆ T . By Theorem 1 there exists a
substitution τ of size polynomial in |Sub(T )| (and consequently, polynomial in
|Sub(S)|) such that τ |= Sθ. From this we have θτ |= S. Moreover, since both
θ and τ are of polynomial size on |Sub(S)|, σ′ = θτ is also of polynomial size
on |Sub(S)| and σ′ |= S.
From the previous result we can directly derive an NP decision procedure
for constraint systems satisfiability: guess a substitution of polynomial size in
|Sub(S)| and check whether it satisfies S in polynomial time (see e.g. [1]).
5 Conclusion
We have obtained the first decision procedure for deducibility constraints with
negation and we have applied it to the synthesis of mediators subject to non-
disclosure policies. It has been implemented as an extension of CL-AtSe [21]
for the Dolev-Yao deduction system. On the Loan Origination case study,
the prototype generates directly the expected orchestration. Without negative
constraints undesired solutions in which the mediator impersonates the clerks
were found. More details, including problem specifications, can be found at
http://cassis.loria.fr/Cl-Atse. As in [1, 5] our definition of subterm de-
duction systems can be extended to allow ground terms in right-hand sides of
decomposition rules even when they are not subterms of left-hand sides and the
decidability result remains valid with minor adaptation of the proof. A more
challenging extension would be to consider general constraints (as in [3]) with
negation.
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